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Abstract
A number of countries are considering, mainly as part of their obligations under current
treaties, domestic actions to internalize the social cost of pollution. One of the major
obstacles, however, in those countries is the fear of jeopardizing their competitive
position in world markets. A policy that has been repeatedly proposed to deal with
this challenge is a tariff mitigating any distortions arising from cross-country differences
in environmental policy. Such unilateral actions are the focus of this paper. It is argued
that if a country set its pollution taxes optimally, cooperatively or non-cooperatively,
there exist unilateral tariff reforms that improve global welfare.
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1 Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) predicts that under “business as
usual” the global mean temperature over the next century will increase by between 3.7oC
and 4.8oC compared to pre-industrial levels. The potential consequences, both physical and
economic, of such considerable temperature increases are likely to be catastrophic (Stern
(2006) and Jones et al. (2012)). It is reckoned that to reduce the adverse impact of dangerous
levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases concentration, it would be required, collectively, to
slow and then cut global GHG emissions by a substantial 40-70 percent by 2050, compared to
2010 levels and GtCO2eq near to zero (IPCC 2014).1 This along with the asymmetric impact
of climate change and the unboundary nature of emissions reveals the need for international
cooperation.2 But such cooperation is not easy to be achieved, as was seen in the Kyoto or
the Copenhagen Protocol.
In response to this challenge, a number of countries are considering, mainly as part of their
obligations under current treaties, domestic action to address climate change. One of the
major obstacles, however, in those countries towards taking such action, is the concern
that it may disadvantage domestic industries relative to producers in countries that do not
undertake similar actions. At the heart of this issue lies a classic free-rider problem. Since
the reduction of greenhouse gases is a global public good each country would prefer the
others to cut emissions thereby avoiding bearing the cost.
A unilateral policy action that has been repeatedly proposed to deal with this challenge
could include a provision that forces goods entering the home market to internalize the cost
of pollution. A measure that does this is a border-tax-adjustments (BTAs) on imported goods
1For recent—and insightful—surveys on the issue see Chen and Woodland (2013) and Jones et al. (2013).
2Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) research the interaction between environmental and trade policies from a
cooperative perspective and the characterization of each policy as a Pareto efficient instrument. Turunen-Red
and Woodland (2004) argue that multilateral agreements on international trade and environmental policy
could be welfare improving.
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that levels the playing field between domestic producers that face costly climate measures and
foreign producers that face very few. A BTA would put a charge (in the form of a carbon tax)
on imported goods equivalent to what these goods would have had to be charged if they had
been produced domestically. In the case of exported goods the scheme rebates any payment
of carbon taxes to exporters. By doing this it preserves mitigation of emissions without
affecting the international competitiveness of carbon-intensive sectors thereby mitigating
carbon leakage incentives (that is; mitigating the incentive of carbon-intensive sectors to
relocate production to countries with low environmental standards). 3
There are many issues related to the legality, implementation and effectiveness of the BTAs
as a carbon pricing policy (Condon and Ignaciuk, 2013; Holmes et al., 2011; Kortum and
Weisbach, 2016; OECD, 2016; Trachtman, 2017). As it has been advocated by many aca-
demics and policymakers the legal status of BTAs is unambiguous (Cosbey et al., 2012;
Hillman, 2013; Pauwelyn, 2012). According the WTO provisions countries can adopt non-
discriminatory “harmonizing” carbon tariff as a straight forward extension of the domestic
climate policy provided that the tariff imposed on imported “like” goods does not exceed
the corresponding domestic tax4 and the rebate of tax on export does not exceed the tax
previously paid.5 BTAs are also justifiable under the environmental exceptions in Article
XX of GATT.6 On contrary, the implementation and effectiveness of BTAs raises a lot of
concerns with the main one being the use of BTAs as a trade manipulation and protection
mechanism (Holmes et al., 2011; Moore, 2010). Other issues relate to the set of goods and
3For an analysis on BTAs (as Pareto efficient devices) see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
4GATT Article III:2. ”The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover,
no contracting party shall apply internal taxes.... to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to
the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” The reference in Art. III:1 states that: ”internal taxes should not
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
5GATT Article XVI: ”The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes born by the like product
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess
of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed a subsidy.”
6GATT, Article XX, Paragraph (b) “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” and
Paragraph (g): “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”
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sectors to be covered by the BTAs (Cosbay et al., 2012) and the monitoring and administra-
tive cost, as goods may be imported from countries that do not monitor their GHG emissions
(Pauwelyn, 2012). Despite these concerns BTAs remain at the centre of the environmental
debate. The Paris Agreement implies the absence of consensus about the adequacy of coun-
tries’ climate efforts while at the same time requires countries to increase their mitigation
efforts over time. With countries being able to judge efforts by others as “inadequate” the
pressure for implementing BTAs to bridge these asymmetries, correcting for their effects on
competitiveness and carbon leakage, will be increased.7
The study of unilateral governments’ actions has not been neglected from the trade and
environmental literature. The main body of this literature focuses on the identification of
the first and second best optimal policy level of unilateral policy instruments; less attention
has been paid on reforms of policy instruments and their effect on welfare.8 The first and
second best optimal is key issue in the analysis of Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988),
Krutilla (1991) Hoel (1996), Copeland (1996), Beghin et al. (1997), Hatzipanayotou et al
(2002, 2008), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) for open economics in the presence of pollution
externalities. Within this context they identify the optimal level of policy instruments when
environmental and trade policies are available focusing also on the case of only one policy
tool being available with the other one being distorted away from its optimal level. Less
attention has being paid to unilateral policy reforms. Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al.
(1997) consider such reforms for environmental and trade policy instruments in the context
of small open economy, establishing the existence of unilateral reforms that deliver potential
Pareto improvement. In particular, it is argued that reforms of pollution and trade taxes and
quotas, in proportion to their deviation from their optimal level, are welfare improving. In
7For more detailed discussion on the Paris Agreement see Cosday, (2016) and Hawkins (2016).
8As it is known form the literature on distortions (e.g. Bhagwati, 1971), first best policy requires at least
two instruments e.g. trade taxes and emission taxes. Each instrument directly affects its corresponding
economic sector (trade taxes affect trade flows, emission taxes affect emissions). However each instrument
indirectly affects the other sectors. While in the second best optimal case, at least one of the available policy
instruments is constrained away from its optimal level, the remaining ones must take account of all economic
activities.
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a similar context Neary (2005) identifies the first and second best optimal level of emissions
binding standards, emission taxes and trade tariffs. He also examines the welfare effects of
unilateral reforms of the available policy instruments. Hatzipanayotou et al (2008), within a
model of two small open economies with two goods and cross-border pollution, identify the
effect of cross-border pollution and terms of trade changes on Nash emission taxes, emission
levels and welfare arguing that under certain circumstances they can be welfare increasing.
Although the characterization of tariffs (BTAs) as a Pareto efficient instrument is well un-
derstood,9 it is not entirely clear whether, starting from a distorting initial equilibrium (in
emission levels), there exist tariff reforms undertaken unilaterally by a country that increases
global welfare. And this is the objective of this paper. It will be shown that, with the envi-
ronmental policy set at its optimal non-cooperative or cooperative level, there exists a tariff
reform—and one that changes tariffs equi-proportionately— that maximizes aggregate wel-
fare. Such reform are commonly used in the international trade and environmental literature
as in Baumol and Oates (1988), Copeland (1994) and Neary (2006). This paper deviates
from these researches as it allows for transboundary pollution externalities and captures also
the foreign country’s responses to home country’s fiscal policy distortions. Also by focusing
on a small open economy we are able to focus clearly, compared to the case of large open
economies, on the effects of trade distortions on environmental quality. Interestingly the
source of inefficiency of the pollution distortion is coming only through the home country’s
production which consequently affects foreign country’s utility.10
9see among others Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988), Krutilla (1991) Hoel (1996), Copeland
(1996), Neary (2005), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) Tsakiris et al (2014)
10This is a realistic scenario as most developed countries considering to implement BTAs cannot affect
the international price of most of the goods they trade. Despite the fact that BTAs have not been imple-
mented by any country until now they remain a topical issue, see Condon and Ignaciuk (2013), Kortum and
Weisbach (2016). Although, as is argued by Cernat (2010) “in pursuit of green growth the EU must avoid
protectionism”, over time politicians have revisited the idea of BTAs which is in line with the EU Emission
Trading System (EU ETS) Directive (see among others Helm, 2014; Hontelez, 2007 and Foure et al, 2013) .
Similar provisions were made by the US Federal cap and trade scheme under the American Clean Energy and
Security Bill (Waxman-Markey), although it was never passed into law (for recent discussion of US climate
policy see Sandbu, 2017).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
discusses the existence of welfare increasing tariff reforms in the presence of optimal non-
cooperative pollution taxes. Section 4 introduces welfare increasing tariff reforms in the
presence of optimal cooperative pollution taxes while Section 5 summarizes the results and
discusses their policy relevance.
2 Description of the model
The framework is a standard model of international trade with two countries labeled “home”
and “foreign”. Home and foreign country’s variables are indexed by lower- and upper-case
letters, respectively. The economy is a perfectly competitive with home country being a
small open one, thus it cannot affect international prices, w.11
In each country there are N tradeable commodities. The first traded commodity is used as
the numeraire good, with its home and foreign prices being normalized to unity. Throughout
the analysis it will be assumed that the numeraire good is untaxed. Pollution is modeled as
a by-product of production in the sense that production generates some pollutant, denoted
by the N -vector z, for the home, and Z for the foreign country. Total emissions in the home
(foreign) country denoted by k(K) are given by i′z (i′Z), where i is the N -vector of 1s (and
a prime denotes transposition).
Pollution is transboundary and given by12
k = K = i′z + i′Z . (1)
In each country there is a representative consumer with preferences represented by the ex-
11The current framework does not impose any restrictions on the size of the foreign country.
12Notice that one can also introduce (the degree of) externalities across countries. This, however, would
add no additional insights.
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penditure function e(u, k, p) (E(U,K, P )) that gives the minimum expenditure required to
achieve utility u¯ (U¯) given pollution k (K) and prices p (P ) respectively for each country.
e(p, u, k) = min
x
{p′x : u (x, k) ≥ u¯} (2)
E(P,U,K) = min
x
{
P ′X : U (X,K) ≥ U¯} ,
with, as an envelope property, ep (Ep) being the vector of compensated demands and ek (EK)
the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction in terms of the private
good. Notice, for later use that, ek > 0 (EK > 0) since pollution is a “public bad”; a unit of
extra consumption of pollution requires by the consumer a positive compensation in terms
of the private good.
Home country imposes sector-specific pollution taxes, given by the N -vector s. All collected
revenues are returned to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion.
The private sector in the home country is perfectly competitive and characterized by the
revenue function
r(p, s, v) = max
y,z
{p′y − s′z : (y, z) ∈ τ(v)} , (3)
where τ(v) is the home country’s technology set, v is the vector of endowments, and y
denotes the (net) output of tradeable goods. The revenue function in (3) gives the maximum
revenues generated for given prices p and pollution taxes s. It has the standard properties:
It is a convex function, homogeneous of degree one in p and s and (assumed to be) twice
continuously differentiable.13 Given the properties of the revenue function, the matrices rpp
and rss are both positive semi-definite matrices.
14
13Notice that implicit in (3) is that the private sector can abate environmental discharges by altering
production patterns.
14The endowment vectors, being fixed, are being suppressed from what follows.
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Hotelling’s lemma implies that, the output vector is given by
y = rp (p, s) , (4)
whereas the vector of emissions (associated with the production of the N tradeable goods)
is give —as an envelope property from (3)— by
z = −rs (p, s) . (5)
Production in the foreign country is described by
R(P, S, V ) = max
Y,Z
{P ′Y − S ′Z : (Y, Z) ∈ T (V )} . (6)
Following (6), as an envelope property, the output and the emissions vectors are defined,
respectively, by
Y = Rp (P, S) ; Z = −Rs(P, S) , (7)
where P is the foreign country’s price vector of the tradeable goods.
The home country uses trade taxes (or subsidies if they are exported) —denoted by the
N -vector t— on the tradeable goods with any revenues being returned to the consumer in a
lump-sum fashion.
Given the vector of pollution taxes and tariffs, the equilibrium for this economy, assuming
8
it exists, is characterized by
e (u, k, p) = r (p, s) + t′ (ep (u, k, p)− rp (p, s)) + s′z , (8)
E(U,K, P ) = R(P, S) + SZ, (9)
p = P + t , (10)
P = w , (11)
k = K = i′z + i′Z = −i′rs(p, s)− i′Rs (P, S) . (12)
Equations (8) and (9) represent the budget constraint of the consumer of the home and
the foreign country, respectively: It simply says that (for the home country) expenditures
given by e (u, k, p) are equal to GDP, given by r(p, s), plus the pollution-tax and the tariffs
revenues, given by s′z and t′ (ep (u, k, p)− rp (p, s)). Similarly for the foreign country—in
the absence of trade taxes— expenditures E(U,K, P ) are equal to GDP R(P, S) plus the
pollution tax revenues. Equation (10) stands for the home country’s prices which are equal
to the foreign country’s goods prices plus the imposed tariffs on imported goods. Finally,
equation (11) is the foreign country’s goods prices which are equal to international ones.
Perturbing equation (12), after making use of the fact that—following15 dw = 0—dp = dt
one obtains16
dk = dK = −i′rspdt− i′rssds . (13)
Totally differentiating equation (8)—after making use of (4), (13) and the fact that dp = dt
and also dP = 0—one obtains
eu(1− t′m)du = [(eki′ − t′epki′ − s′) rsp − t′λ] dt+ [(eki′ − t′epki′ − s′) rss − t′rps] ds , (14)
15Recall that this is small open economy.
16Equation (13) shows the limitation of fixed international prices w. If international prices could be affected
by home country’s tariffs and pollution taxes, the home country would be able to affect foreign production
directly via international prices w, since they are functions of domestic instruments. To see this notice that,
following (6), dK = −i′RSP dw. Any change in s or t would affect w and so, in turn, K.
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where 1− t′m > 0, with m = epu/eu > 0, and λ = rpp− epp is a positive semi-definite matrix
of home excess compensated supplies.17
Equation (14) shows, clearly, that home country welfare depends on a number of distortions.
In particular:
 The term eki
′ − t′epki′ − s′ gives the deviation of the marginal damage, in the home
country, from the pollution-tax vector s. With trade taxes, an increase in pollution
affects consumers through two effects: A direct one, given by eki
′, and an indirect one,
given by t′epki′, through the trade distortions and so via a change in the compensated
demands. If the compensated demands fall because of an increase in pollution, and so
epk < 0, then the trade distortion is exacerbated by the pollution.
 The term t′λ which gives the effect of changes in the import demand as a consequence
of the change in tariffs.
Similarly, pollution taxes have a number of effects on welfare.
 The term eki
′ gives the direct effect (a reduction of pollution which represent a welfare
gain) of the tax on pollution.
 The term t′epki′ gives the indirect effect through the trade distortion.
 The term t′rps gives the effect of pollution taxes on welfare through tax revenues (since
imports change as a consequence of changes in the policy instrument).
17eu (1− t′m) gives the change in the real income, deflated by the tariff multiplier, Neary (2006). The fact
that 1− t′m > 0 relates to the stability of the equilibrium (and to the Hatta normality condition).
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3 Tariff reforms in the presence of non-cooperative en-
vironmental policy
The balance of the effects described above define, according to equation (14), the optimal
policies of the home country.18 Clearly, and in the absence of tariffs, the preceding discussion
suggests that the home country will set pollution taxes, at the optimum level eki = s. Indeed
this is the case. To see this set t = 0 and dt = 0 in (14) to obtain
eudu = (eki
′ − s′) rssds , (15)
and so optimality, from the home country’s perspective, dictates that the optimal pollution
tax is given by —given that rss is (assumed to be) invertible—s = eki.
Optimal second best environmental policy for the home country dictates that it sets pollution
taxes equal to the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction.
The fact that home country sets s = eki is intuitive: Since the home country cannot affect
international prices and, therefore, pollution in the foreign country it sets the marginal
willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution at home ek equal to the pollution-tax s.
19
The analysis turns next to the search for Pareto improving tariff reforms when the home
18With each policy instrument directly affecting its corresponding economic sector (tariffs affect trade
flows whereas pollution taxes affect emissions), it is intuitive that the first best optimal policy requires the
use of two policy instruments: tariffs targeting trade flows and pollution taxes targeting the externality
directly. Under second best optimal policy either there is only one policy instrument available or there are
two but one has been set at inefficient levels. For contributions see, among others, Markusen (1975), Krutila
(1991), Hoel (1996), Neary (2006), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
19One, of course, might ask whether, starting from an initial situation in which ek 6= s, a pollution
tax reform that increases utility in the home country can be implemented. The answer to this is in the
affirmative. Consider, for instance, the reform that changes s equiproportionally to its difference from the
marginal external damage of pollution that is, ds = (ek − s) da where a is a scalar and da > 0. In this case
(15) reduces to
eu (1− t′m) du = (ek − s)′ rss (ek − s) da > 0
where the inequality sign following from the fact that rss is a positive semi-definite matrix. This reconfirms
the result in Copeland (1994), p.51.
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country set its pollution taxes at their second best optimum level.
Suppose now that the home country imposes pollution taxes optimally following (15) and
the foreign country’s pollution taxes S are fixed at arbitrary levels. Perturbing (9), for fixed
pollution tax vector s and S, with dw = 0 and using equation (13), one obtains
EUdU = EKi
′rspdt . (16)
As can be seen from (16) foreign welfare is affected by the home country’s tariffs but,
interestingly, not because tariffs have a price effect on foreign demand but simply because
they affect production at home and so pollution in the foreign country (the term i′rsp).20
What (16) also shows is the possibility that the foreign country might benefit from a tariff
reform in the home country.21
Aggregate welfare,22,23 following from (14) and (16) with pollution taxes set to optimum, is
given by
δdu+ ∆dU = [(Eki
′ − t′epki′) rsp − t′λ] dt , (17)
where δ ≡ eu (1− t′m) and ∆ ≡ EU . It is now easy to see that the optimal tariff that
maximizes global welfare is given by
t′ (s) = (Eki′ − t′epki′) rspλ−1 , (18)
20Notice that—as alluded to earlier—if the home country’s emissions do not respond to prices, and so
rsp = 0, then the home country’s tariffs will not affect foreign welfare.
21This will be the case if, for instance, tariffs change according to dt = Eki
′da where a is a scalar. In this
case (16) reduces to EUdU = Eki
′rspEki′da. The welfare sign of this depends on the structure of the matrix
rsp, which cannot be signed without additional assumptions on the structure of technology (see Copeland,
1994), and on the direction of da. All the reform requires is that da taken the same sign of rsp.
22The home country undertakes a global perspective as its actions aim to tackle pollution and not rent
seeking, as in Copeland (1996). Also a tariff reform that is aggregate welfare increasing will be easier to be
justified under the WTO principles.
23Implicitly, behind this is the existence of lump sum transfers between countries and the welfare of each
country is equally weighted.
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where t (s) denotes the dependence of the optimal tariff on pollution distortions. What (18)
emphasizes is that it is not only distortions via trade (in the sense of changes in the home
country’s compensated demands, epki
′rspλ−1) that the optimal tariff should account for, but
also the foreign country pollution distortions (Eki
′rspλ−1), that affect foreign (and so global)
utility. Notice that if rsp = 0, then the optimal tariff, from a world welfare perspective,
is zero: The point here being that tariffs cannot affect production decisions at home and,
therefore, should not be used; free trade is optimal.
The question that now arises is to what extent one can construct a tariff reform that raises
global welfare.24 This is to what we now turn. To answer this it will help re-writing—using
(18)—aggregate welfare in (17) as
δdu+ ∆dU = [t (s)− t]′ λdt . (19)
Consider now the scenario of moving tariffs towards their Pareto efficient level in the sense
that
dt = [t(s)− t] da , (20)
with da > 0. Substituting (20) into (19) we have that
δdu+ ∆dU = [t (s)− t]′ λ [t(s)− t] da > 0 , (21)
where the inequality follows from the fact that λ is a positive semi-definite matrix (and
da > 0). This simply says that if the optimal tariff that maximizes global welfare t(s) is
above the existing one t it should be increased. If on the other hand t (s) < t then it should
be reduced. To emphasize:
24As the home country sets its environmental policy at the second best optimal non-cooperative level it
does not internalize the externality to the foreign country.
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Proposition 1 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with t 6= t (s), and
initial pollution taxes set at their second best optimal non-cooperative level s = eki, then a
tariff reform in the sense of (20) is Pareto improving.
Proposition 1 can be seen as a generalization of Copeland (1994).25 The difference of the
present analysis to the one in Copeland (1994) is that here the home country takes a global
perspective (as it also receives utility from the foreign country).26 Intuitively, Proposition
1 states that the source of inefficiency, given that international prices are fixed, is not the
foreign country but the home one. It is the production of the home country that the reform
should be accounting for, and not by how much the foreign country produces and so pollutes.
Though the result of Proposition 1 is, arguably, insightful it seems to be rather restrictive as
it is assumed that pollution taxes have been determined under the assumption that tariffs
are zero. I now relax this assumption. Suppose that optimal pollution taxes are set at their
optimal first best level and so—following (14)—at
s′ = eki′ − t′epki′ − t′rpsr−1ss . (22)
Making use now of the fact that r (p, s) is homogeneous of degree one in p and s we have
(following (14)) that27
eu (1− t′m) = t′eppdt . (23)
Suppose now that tariffs change according to dt = −tda for some da > 0.(and so uniformly).
Then
eu (1− t′m) = −t′epptda > 0 , (24)
where the inequality follows from the fact that epp is a negative semi-definite matrix.
25For more detailed analysis on the effects of equiproportional distortions on welfare see Dixit (1985) and,
in a similar context, Baumol and Oates (1988).
26This, as briefly touched upon in the introductory section, relates to border tax adjustments. It is the
direction of the reform, and not of the determination of the actual tariff that is the concern here.
27This implies that rppp+ rpss = 0 and rspp+ rsss = 0, and so rpsr
−1
ss rsp = rpp.
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Turning now to global welfare which, following from (16) and (23), is given by
δdu+ ∆dU = (Eki
′rsp + t′epp) dt . (25)
the optimal tariff is given by
t′ (s) = −Eki′rspe−1pp , (26)
which upon close inspection—and in contrast to equation (18)—it reveals that it is indepen-
dent of the home country’s pollution distortion. This is intuitive as the home country takes
into account its own pollution distortion by setting its pollution taxes optimally according
to (22).
Consider now an equiproportional movement of tariffs towards their optimum level, in the
sense that
dt = − [t− t (s)] da , (27)
for a scalar da > 0. Global welfare can then be written as
δdu+ ∆dU = − [t− t (s)]′ epp [t− t (s)] da > 0 . (28)
So we have that:
Proposition 2 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with t 6= t (s), and
assuming that pollution taxes are set at their first best optimal non-cooperative level, then a
home country’s tariff reform of the form of (27) is Pareto improving. 28
28The home country’s tariff reform (27) can be Potential Pareto improving under the additional assumption
that rsp > 0 .
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4 Tariff reforms in the presence of cooperative envi-
ronmental policyes
Suppose now that the home country, restricted by an environmental agreement, is obligated
to set its pollution taxes cooperatively, maximizing the aggregate welfare29 then, the arising
question is weather we can identify a Pareto-improving tariff reform.30 The aggregate welfare
is given by31
δdu+ ∆dU = [(eki
′ − t′epki′ − s′) rsp − t′λ] dt (29)
+ [(eki
′ − t′epki′ − s′) rss − t′rps] ds
+ Eki
′rspdt+ Eki′rssds ,
where δ ≡ eu (1− t′m) and ∆ ≡ EU . By setting its pollution taxes in a cooperative fashion,
the home country should take into account the sum of damages eki + Eki, that a marginal
emission causes in all countries, both to itself and the other country. To see this set t = 0
and dt = 0 in (29) to obtain
eudu+ EUdU = [(eki
′ + Eki′ − s′) rss] ds , (30)
and so from the aggregate perspective, optimal pollution taxes—given that rss is (assumed
to be) invertible—are given by s = eki+ Eki.
Second best optimal cooperative policy dictates that the home country’s pollution taxes
should be uniform within the country and equal to the aggregate consumer’s marginal will-
29This can be justified by the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” ( United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Principle 1 of Article 3).
30An example of this case would be a small European country committed to undertake mitigation measures
irrespective of action elsewhere—such policies include the 2020 climate & energy package, 2030 climate &
energy framework—and eligible, under the WTO regulation, to apply tariffs in the form of BTAs.
31As previously, we allow for unconstrained lump sum transfers between countries and the welfare of each
country is equally weighted.
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ingness to pay for pollution reduction. This reconfirms the result of Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2014): Moving along the world’s second-best utility possibility frontier requires that the
home country sets its pollution taxes in each sector so as to equate the value of income loss
that this causes itself, given by s, to the sum of the damages eki + Eki, that a marginal
emission causes in all countries, both to itself and the other country.
Setting the home country’s pollution taxes at their second best cooperative optimum level
aggregate, welfare becomes
δdu+ ∆dU = − [t′epki′rsp + t′λ] dt . (31)
Following from equation (31) the tariff that maximizes global welfare is t′(s) = −t′epkrspλ−1.
The fact that the optimal tariff is not accounting for the foreign country’s pollution distor-
tions is intuitive: As the home country sets its environmental taxes in a cooperative fashion it
internalizes the externality and its effects on the foreign country’s consumer.32 Rearranging
the terms of equation (31) we obtain
δdu+∆dU= [t′(s)− t′]λdt ,
32Notice that the optimal tariffs from the home country’s perspective, setting its environmental taxes
cooperatively, are given by
eu(1− t´m)du = [(−Eki´− t´epki´)rsp − t´l]dt, (32)
t´(s) = −(Eki´ + tepki´)rspl-¹,
this is symmetrical to the cooperative second best optimal tariffs when the home country sets its pollution
taxes non-cooperative, equation (18). The difference between the two lies in the sign of the effect of home
country’s pollution distortion on foreign country (Eki
′rspλ−1). This is due to the fact that by setting its
pollution taxes cooperatively home country takes into account the damages that a marginal emission causes
to the foreign country’s consumer.
Rearranging the terms of (32) home country’s welfare becomes
eu(1− t´m)du = [t (s)− t]′ λdt .
Considering now a tariffs reform that moves tariffs towards their Pareto efficient level dt = [t(s)− t] da ,with
da > 0— given that λ is a positive semi-definite matrix— home country’s welfare increases
eu(1− t´m)du = [t (s)− t]′ λ [t(s)− t] da ≥ 0 .
17
where t′(s) = −t′epkrspλ−1. Considering now a uniform reform of tariffs such that
dt = [t(s)− t] da, (33)
with da > 0. If the home country implements a reform of (33), global welfare increases
δdu+ ∆dU = [t(s)− t] ′λ [t(s)− t] da > 0. (34)
The inequality follows from the fact that λ is a positive semi-definite matrix (and da > 0).
To emphasize:
Proposition 3 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with pollution taxes
set at their second best optimal cooperative level s = eki + Eki, then a tariff reform in the
sense of (33) is Pareto-improving.
Proposition 3 differs from Proposition 1 as the home country’s tariff reform (33) does not
account for the home country’s pollution distortions (Eki
′rspλ−1) that affect the foreign
country’s consumer. This is due to the fact that the home country’s cooperative pollution
taxes take into account the damages, Eki, a marginal emission causes to the foreign country’s
consumer. Proposition 3 suggests that the reform should account for the home country’s
pollution distortions to its own consumer as well as the tariff effect on its own production
and through that pollution.
Turning now to the search of tariff reforms with the environmental taxes set at their first
best cooperative level which, following from equation (29), are given by
s´ = eki´ + Eki´− t´epki´− t´rpsrss-¹ . (35)
Equation (35) implies that the first best cooperative pollution taxes should account not
only for the damage that the marginal emission causes to the home and foreign country’s
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consumer but also for the level of the imposed tariff weighted by the effect of the marginal
emission on compensated demand (t´epk) as well as the changes on tariff revenues (t´rpsrss
-
¹)
due to the effect of the pollution taxes on production.
Setting now the pollution taxes at their first best cooperative level, it is straightforward
to verify that cooperatively free trade is optimum. Since the home country cannot affect
international prices and so production capabilities of the foreign country and it takes into
account the damage to the foreign country’s consumer by setting its environmental taxes at
their cooperative first best optimal level.33
Aggregate welfare, following from (29) with pollution taxes set at their first best cooperative
level, is given by
δdu+ ∆dU = (t´rpsrss
-
¹rsp − t′λ) dt ,
which due to the fact that r (p, s) is homogeneous of degree one in p and s becomes
δdu+ ∆dU = t′eppdt .
Since epp is a negative semi-definite matrix there exists increasing welfare tariff reform that
33Notice that the optimal non cooperative tariffs—setting pollution taxes to their optimal first best coop-
erative level— are given by
eu(1− t′m)du = [(−Eki´ + t´rpsrss-¹) rsp − t′λ] dt ,
eu(1− t′m)du =
(−Eki´rspe−1pp + t´) e−1pp dt ,
t′(s) =Eki´rspe−1pp .
Optimality dictates that the non cooperative tariffs should account for the tariff effect on home country’s
emissions and so foreign country’s consumer, weighted by their effect on home country’s compensated de-
mand. The sign of optimal tariffs depends on the pollution intensity of home country’s production rsp, (for
more detailed discussion on the sign of rsp matrix see Neary, 2006). Considering now a tariff reform that
moves tariffs proportionally towards their optimum level, dt = [t(s)− t] da for some da > 0,—given that epp
is a negative semi-definite matrix—home country’s welfare increases
eu(1− t′m)du = − (t(s)− t)′ e−1pp (t(s)− t) da ≥ 0 .
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reduces the tariffs proportionate, dt = −tda for some da > 0. Then
δdu+ ∆dU = −t′epptda ≥ 0 ,
Proposition 4 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, t 6=0, and initial pol-
lution taxes set at their first best optimal cooperative level , then a tariff reform proportional
to the initial tariffs level is Pareto-improving.
Proposition 4 generalizes the results of Copeland (1994) and Neary (2006) taking into account
the transboundary nature of pollution and considering cooperative first best allocation of
environmental taxes. Similar to the previous results Proposition 4 suggests that the source
of inefficiency is the home thus the reform should account only for the home country’s
production.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the existence of, starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted
equilibrium, Pareto improving tariff reforms (of a particular type). It has shown that for a
small open regulating economy, and in the presence of transboundary pollution, the source of
inefficiency of the environmental quality is driven only through the level of production of the
home country. It is this production that the home country’s tariff reform targets to reduce
and this is true in the presence of either cooperative or non cooperative, first or second best,
pollution taxes. This contradicts the underlying idea of BTAs that they are global welfare
increasing due to the response—through production reform—of the country with the weaker
environmental regulation (see Gros, 2009; Sanctuary, 2013). Since the country implementing
the BTAs cannot affect international prices, the reform targets the production of the home
20
country which not only benefits the home country (by having less emissions) but also benefits
the foreign country through a reduction in harmful emissions.
The limitations of the paper suggest avenues for future research. International prices have
been kept fixed and as a consequence the home country cannot influence foreign production
abroad. It would be interesting to allow for the home country to be a large open economy
(as in Turunen-Red and Woodland, 2004; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2014) and, therefore, be
able to influence the terms of trade (and the comparative advantage in the production of
goods) of the foreign country. This will be consistent with the current rhetoric in favour of
border tax adjustments.
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